The Surplus-to-Structure framework is designed to produce pilots that can be templated across portfolios — the first project teaches the framework, subsequent projects deploy it at lower marginal cost. Climate, resilience, and sovereignty are modelled in the same frame as commercial pro forma (the standard projected financial statement lenders expect to see).
Most clean-energy infrastructure in Pacific and emerging markets fails to clear commercial-only IRR (a standard investment-return metric) hurdles. The framework explicitly models the resilience, sovereignty, and capability-transfer dimensions that justify concessional terms (financing priced below normal market rates) — and quantifies them in the same model that produces the commercial pro forma. The result is a fundable case that meets both the impact thesis and the financial-discipline test.
Pacific island projects illustrate the pattern. Diesel displacement creates the anchor commercial case (the reliable, foundational rationale the rest of the project's economics builds on). Oversizing the renewable system above contracted load generates surplus that funds desalination, ice-making, cold-chain food export, and resilience capacity — each of which has its own value-per-kWh (value earned per kilowatt-hour, a standard unit of electricity) that the ranking model captures. The integrated chain is more valuable than the components.
Three dimensions modelled explicitly in the framework, with confidence levels visible on every output.
Additionality (proof the emissions cut would not have happened anyway) framework is explicit. The displacement, avoided-emissions, and induced-demand effects are kept separate so the climate impact case stands on its own — and so it can be audited against MEL frameworks (Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning — the standard way aid programmes track results).
Resilience value is monetised against the cost-of-failure (lives, economic disruption, fuel resupply) rather than left as a qualitative impact column.
Operating capability transfers to local operators on a defined schedule. The asset belongs to the host country. Sovereign capability is a deliverable, not an aspiration.
Three engagement types most common for DFIs (development finance institutions) and concessional capital allocators.
| Engagement | Duration | Price band |
|---|---|---|
| Pacific country surplus assessment + pilot scoping (P1 + P2) | 12–20 weeks | POA (price on application) |
| Multi-country programme framework | 16–24 weeks | POA |
| Standing instance for in-house DFI use (P5) | 12–24 wks build + ongoing | POA |
Where the framework is used to identify projects, and we are also asked to co-develop those projects, the engagements are run as separate procurements with the DFI's normal arm's-length rules. The firm does not pursue both sides of a transaction without explicit DFI consent and standard segregation arrangements. The conflict structure is described in the firm's principles.
Most engagements start with a single-country assessment. The framework then templates outward — one calibration, twenty island states with parameter swaps. Multi-country programmes follow once the template is proven.
Concessional engagements may be partially grant-funded. We will tell you which side of the procurement we sit on at intake.